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	In	Anthropocene	or	in	Chuthulucene	
	
This	essay	considers	international	regulation	of	emerging	technologies	at	dawn	of	the	
Chutullucene1	and	starts	the	enterprise	of	reengineering	regulatory	and	governance	concepts	
to	take	into	account	concepts	of	knowledge	co-production2	and	wicked	complexity.3	If	we	are	
to	take	the	advice	of	Donna	Haraway,	“we	must	address	intense,	systemic	urgencies.	“4	Is	
climate	change	one	of	these	systemic	urgencies?	What	role	has	technology,	more	
appropriately,	what	role	will	technologies	play	and	what	has	our	understanding	of	past	
technologies	and	their	regulation	played	in	our	ability	to	produce	regulation,	international	or	
otherwise,	that	is	appropriate?	One	working	principle	is	that	appropriateness	of	regulation	and	
governance	is	indicated	by	the	ability	to	bring	out	desired	outcomes,	that	is	effectiveness.	This	
in	turn	implies	that	regulation	and	governance	must	be	informed	by	corresponding	values	as	
organising	principles.		
	
One	of	the	many	claims	being	made	in	academic	and	non-academic	narratives,	it	is	that	
synthetic	biology,	at	least	in	the	form	of	iGEM	(international	genetically	engineered	
machines),5	is	that	one	enabler	in	the	so-called	third	industrial	revolution.6	However	this	third	
industrial	revolution	is	as	cluttered	with	claims	to	its	enablers	as	it	is	to	its	very	happening.	
Some	propose	that	we	are	seeing	with	the	emergence	of	artificial	intelligence	and	the	
convergence	of	physical,	mechanical,	digital,	chemical	and	biological	technologies,	is	the	fourth	
industrial	revolution.7	It’s	not	complicated,	it	is	complex	and	muddled.	
																																								 																				
1	Donna	Haraway,	‘Anthropocene,	Capitalocene,	Plantationocene,	Chthulucene:	
Making	Kin’,	Environmental	Humanities	6	(2015):	159–65.	Note	the	various	proposed	
names	for	the	present	epoch	are	subjects	of	considerable	debate,	and	in	itself	point	to	
the	complex	nature	of	the	pluratiy	in	which	we	live.	
2	Sheila	Jasanoff	and	Sang-Hyun	Kim,	eds.,	Dreamscapes	of	Modernity:	Sociotechnical	
Imaginaries	and	the	Fabrication	of	Power	(University	of	Chicago	Press,	2015),	3,	6–7,	
14,	22,	326,	332.	
3	For	an	introduction	to	the	nature	of	‘wicked	complexity’	as	opposed	to	‘static	
complexity’	see:	Braden	R.	Allenby	and	Daniel	Sarewitz,	The	Techno-Human	Condition	
(Cambridge,	Mass.:	The	MIT	Press,	2013),	109.	
4	Haraway,	‘Anthropocene,	Capitalocene,	Plantationocene,	Chthulucene:	Making	Kin’.	
5	Manuel	Porcar	and	Juli	Peretó,	Synthetic	Biology:	From	iGEM	to	the	Artificial	Cell	
(Springer,	2014);	Christina	D	Smolke,	‘Building	outside	of	the	Box:	iGEM	and	the	
BioBricks	Foundation’,	Nat	Biotech	27,	no.	12	(December	2009):	1099–1102;	Rudolph	
Mitchell,	Yehudit	Judy	Dori,	and	Natalie	H.	Kuldell,	‘Experiential	Engineering	Through	
iGEM-An	Undergraduate	Summer	Competition	in	Synthetic	Biology’,	Journal	of	Science	
Education	and	Technology	20	(2011):	156–60.	
6	George	M.	Church	and	Ed	Regis,	Regenesis:	How	Synthetic	Biology	Will	Reinvent	
Nature	and	Ourselves	(Basic	Books,	2012),	179.	
7	Klaus	Schwab,	The	Fourth	Industrial	Revolution	(World	Economic	Forum,	2016);	M.	
Waidner	and	M.	Kasper,	‘Security	in	Industrie	4.0	-	Challenges	and	Solutions	for	the	
Fourth	Industrial	Revolution’,	Dresden,	in	Design,	Automation	Test	in	Europe	
Conference	Exhibition	(Dresden:	IEEE,	2016),	1303–8;	Andrew	D.	Maynard,	‘Navigating	
	This	paper	begins	to	address	the	role	and	prospects	of	international	regulation	of	emerging	
technologies	given	by	the	contexts	provided	by	a	global	economy,	the	aspirations	of	
sustainable	development,	and	the	desire	to	respect	human	rights	as	organising	principles.	To	
do	this	the	complex	relationship	between	the	worlds	of	science	and	technology	and	that	of	law	
need	to	be	revisited	with	the	hope	of	recognizing	past	failures	and	potential	venues	for	action.	
After	setting	the	technologies-context	and	introducing	the	concept	of	co-production,	the	case	
of	biotechnology	is	taken	up	and	discussed	in	light	of	its	newest	developments	in	synthetic	
biology.	A	brief	perusal	through	what	international	regulation	of	technologies	in	general,	and	
WTO	law	in	particular	offer	in	dealing	with	the	advancing	edge	of	technology	finds	the	system	
wanting.	While	there	are	many	proposals	for	global	governance	of	technologies,	none	seem	to	
lend	themselves	to	the	aspirations	of	sustainable	development	and	an	increasing	expectation	
that	whatever	happens	in	technology	or	economics	be	inclusive.		Technologies	
	
Technology	is	not	one	discipline;	it	is	neither	monolithic	nor	homogeneous.	A	plurality	of	
technologies	ranging	from	the	molecular	to	the	planetary	have	evolved	over	time	and	are	
emerging	across	all	scientific	and	technical	disciplines.	Above	all,	technology	is	normative,	not	
a	panacea.8	One	can	also	say	that	technologies	are	artefactual,	and	located	in	time	and	space.	
To	contextualize	international	economic	law	and	how	it	treats	the	regulation	of	technology	in	
time	and	space	calls	for	an	understanding	of	the	interfaces	between	law	and	technology	within	
our	actuality.	Whether	we	want	to	consider	our	actuality	as	modern	post-modern,	or	
accelerationist	may	affect	the	assumptions	to	be	made	about	technology’s	role	in	society	
which	in	turn	yield	different	results	as	to	the	regulatory	options	available	for	consideration.	In	
this	essay	we	use	the	idea	of	modernity,	and	leave	a	post-modernist	approach	for	a	later	
occasion.	Already	the	bridging	of	modernity	–		and	technology	is	a	task	that	leave	most	looking	
for	easier	terrain	to	explore.	
	
The	nature	of	our	actuality	is	marked	by	political,	legal,	moral,	technological,	and	scientific	
discourses	around	global	climate	change,	human	rights	and	dignity	(terrorism	and	war,	
migration,	globalisation),	plus	sustainability,	all	with	an	unprecedented	acceleration	of	
developments	that	strain	and	stress	notions	of	legitimacy,	legal	concepts,	established	
regulatory	agencies	and	mankind’s	own	understanding	of	itself.	
	
First,	the	evolution	of	our	understanding	of	technology	directs	us	to	come	to	grips	with	what	
technology	is	and	to	try	to	understand	it	within	the	globalisation	context.	Broadly	speaking	
technology	is	the	application	of	scientific	knowledge	for	practical	purposes,	especially	in	
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 																	
the	Fourth	Industrial	Revolution’,	Nature	Nanotechnology	10,	no.	12	(December	2015):	
1005–6.	
8	Hans	Radder,	‘Why	Technologies	Are	Inherently	Normative’,	in	Philosophy	of	
Technology	and	Engineering	Sciences,	ed.	Anthonie	Meijers,	Handbook	of	the	
Philosophy	of	Science	(Amsterdam:	North-Holland,	2009),	887–921,	
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/B9780444516671500379.	
	industry.	Such	a	definition,	even	if	taken	from	the	dictionary,	is	coloured	by	instrumental	
rationality.	For	regulatory	purposes	technology	has	been	treated	as	an	exogenous	object	that	
can	be	controlled	in	a	predefined	way	and	that	is	too	pedestrian	for	proper	consideration	by	
the	high	priests	of	the	social	sciences.	This	antiquated	idea	assumes	that	(ubiquitous)	control	
(of	technology)	is	possible.	It	also	overlooks	unintended	consequences	(surprises)	and	
emergent	phenomena.		
	
A	systemic	approach	to	technology	regulation	that	addresses	its	updated	contemporary	
ubiquity,	diversity	and	uncertainties	appears	unexplored.	Technology	regulation	can	be	applied	
in	many	different	social	contexts	–	production,	consumption,	use,	disposal,	etc.	–	that	generate	
plenty	of	legal	questions	and	require	a	multitude	of	carefully	differentiated	considerations	
with	respect	to	the	life-cycle	of	the	specific	technology,	and	the	production-chain	of	that	
industry.	Technology’s	normativity	has	often	been	ignored	and	a	range	of	attitudes	and	values	
have	been	attributed	to	it	depending	on	whatever	ideology	or	theory	permeated	the	thinking	
of	scholars	and	regulators.	In	fact,	pervasiveness	and	success	of	modern	technology	means	
that	technological	decisions	increasingly	affect	social	life.	That	is,	due	to	this	pervasiveness,	
intensity,	and	interwoven	character	of	the	fibres	of	society	and	technology,	“one	can	draw	
diametrically	opposed	conclusions:	either	politics	becomes	another	branch	of	technology,	or	
technology	is	recognized	as	political”.9	Co-production	
We	can	generally	agree	that	an	apparent	acceleration	in	technological	development	creates	
challenges	to	existing	practices	and	normative	understanding	that	are	yet	to	be	identified	be	it	
in	quality,	quantity	or	scope.	That	is,	uncertainty	is	what	we	need	to	cope	with	in	a	world	
marked	by	increasingly	wicked	problems.	Two	different	historicised	surveys	of	technology	
systems	can	serve	as	guiding	posts	towards	trying	to	gain	perspective.	The	first	one	dates	from	
1946,	and	the	second	from	2013.	Lewis	Mumford’s	1946	classification10	is	separated	in	time	by	
half-century	from	that	of	Allenby	and	Sarewitz11	and	while	sinning	in	the	direction	of	
reductionism,	they	can	later	be	analysed	through	the	prism	of	critical	theory	such	as	that	
offered	by	Feenberg.12	
	
Mumford	distinguishes	three	successive	main	technology	phases:	eotechnic,	paleotechnic,	and	
neotechnic	each	marked	by	a	set	of	distinct	inventions.	The	eotechnic	or	early	phase	of	
technics	stretches	roughly	from	1000	to	1750	when	“invention	and	experimental	adaptation	
																																								 																				
9	Andrew	Feenberg,	Questioning	Technology	(Routledge,	2012),	2.	
10	Lewis	Mumford,	Technics	and	Civilization	(London:	Georg	Routledge	&	Sons,	Ltd.,	
1946).	
11	Allenby	and	Sarewitz,	The	Techno-Human	Condition.	
12	Feenberg,	Questioning	Technology;	Andrew	Feenberg,	Between	Reason	and	
Experience:	Essays	in	Technology	and	Modernity	(MIT	Press,	2010);	Tyler	J.	Veak,	
Democratizing	Technology:	Andrew	Feenberg’s	Critical	Theory	of	Technology	(SUNY	
Press,	2006);	Andrew	Feenberg,	Transforming	Technology :	A	Critical	Theory	Revisited:	
A	Critical	Theory	Revisited	(Oxford	University	Press,	USA,	2002).	
	went	on	at	a	slowly	accelerating	pace”	and	new	sources	of	energy	were	developed.13	Once	
equipped	with	mechanical	clocks,	telescopes,	cheap	paper,	printing	presses,	magnetic	
compasses	from	the	eotechnic	the	next	phase	–	the	paleotechnic	–	saw	the	invention	of	the	
steam	engine	and	the	beginning	of	the	destruction	of	the	environment,	and	the	degradation	of	
the	worker	all	in	favour	in	the	doctrine	of	progress	in	what	we	are	accustomed	to	call	the	first	
industrial	revolution	from	ca.	1760	to	1820,	which	is	also	often	referred	to	as	the	first	
industrial	revolution.	The	neotechnic	phase,	the	one	during	which	Mumford	wrote	his	
observations,	is	in	his	words	“a	definite	physical	and	social	complex”	that	began	in	1832	with	
the	“perfection	of	the	water-turbine	by	Fourneyron14	and	is	marked	by	the	conquest	of	new	
forms	of	energy,	namely	electricity.15	Mumford’s	distinctions	are	useful	as	they	illustrate	the	
cumulative	nature	of	technology,	and	its	inextricability	from	the	social	condition	of	man	from	a	
linear	historical	perspective	that	also	demonstrates	the	so-called	acceleration	of	the	pace	of	
invention.	Once	electricity	and	the	steam	engine	enter	our	sociotechnical	world,	technologies	
multiply	in	every	possible	direction	into	every	aspect	of	human	activity.		
	
The	approach	developed	by	Allenby	and	Sarewitz	distinguish	three	levels	of	technology	
designated	I,	II,	and	III.	This	taxonomy	permits	a	clearer	structural	understanding	of	the	
differences	between	toasters	and	nuclear	weapons	perspective.16At	level	I,	technology’s	
intention	and	effect	are	at	hand.	For	example,	toasters	reliably	and	safely	deliver	toasted	
bread	or	airplanes	carry	passengers	from	point	A	to	point	B.	At	level	I	of	technology,	systemic	
complexity	is	forgotten.	Level	II,	in	the	Allenby-Sarewitz	model	we	encounter	the	systemic	
complexity	around	air	travel	(or	the	production	of	toasters	or	automobiles).	That	is,	to	stay	
with	Allenby-Sarewitz	model,	at	level	II	we	have	the	air	transportation	system	embodied	with	
“the	irrationality,	dysfunction	and	insane	price	system,	the	absurd	inefficiency		of	its	boarding	
and	security	processes,	the	continual	delays,	and	…”.17	Looking	at	technology	as	a	whole	in	
level	II,	we	soon	discern	the	first	contours	of	a	system	and	the	emergence	of	the	lock-in	
phenomena	concurrently	with	a	level	II	ambivalence	and	ambiguity	that	is	accompanied	by	a	
reliable	level	I	technology.	The	Allenby-Sarewitz	level	III	pattern	in	this	technology	taxonomy	is	
perhaps	easier	to	recognize	in	highly	networked	transportation	systems	(still,	we	can	also	see	
in	energy	production	systems,	telecommunications,	agriculture,	textiles)	such	as	those	of	
transportation	either	by	air	or	land.	At	level	III	we	observe	the	co-evolution	of	“significant	
changes	in	environmental	and	resource	systems;	mass-market	consumer	capitalism;	individual	
credit;	behavioural	and	aesthetic	subcultures	and	stereotypes;	with	oil	spills;	with	
opportunities	for,	and	a	sense	of,	extraordinary	human	freedom,	especially	for	women…	“.18	
Mumford,	Allenby	and	Sarewitz,	in	spite	of	the	seventy	years	between	their	observations	both	
point	to	the	unequivocal	co-production	of	technology	or	the	“constant	intertwining	of	the	
																																								 																				
13	Mumford,	Technics	and	Civilization,	111–23.	
14	Dietrich	Eckardt,	Gas	Turbine	Powerhouse:	The	Development	of	the	Power	
Generation	Gas	Turbine	at	BBC	-	ABB	-	Alstom	(Walter	de	Gruyter	GmbH	&	Co	KG,	
2014),	49.	Benoit	Fourneyron	(1802-1867)	was	a	French	engineer	educated	at	the	
École	Nationale	des	Mines	de	Saint-Etiénne	.	
15	Mumford,	Technics	and	Civilization,	212ff.	
16	Allenby	and	Sarewitz,	The	Techno-Human	Condition,	36.	
17	Ibid.,	37.	
18	Ibid.,	39.	
	cognitive,	the	material,	the	social	and	the	normative”.19	Co-production	of	natural	and	social	
orders	means	that	the	ways	in	which	we	represent	the	world	are	inseparable	from	the	ways	
that	we	choose	to	live	in	it.20	That	is,	explanatory	power	is	gained	by	thinking	of	natural	and	
social	orders	together	where	both	nature	and	society	are	inseparable.21		
	Science	at	the	Service	of	Technologies	
	
The	common	understanding	is	that	when	evaluating	a	technology’s	effectiveness	and	safety	
the	usual	course	of	action	is	to	make	recourse	to	science	in	assessing	the	technology’s	
effectiveness	and	safety.	There	are	then	two	tasks	that	science	ought	to	accomplish:	fact	
finding	and	deciding	what	is	safe	and	effective.	The	first	task	is	the	one	that	traditional	–	
normal	science	–	is	best	equipped	to	do	within	its	reductionist	walls.	The	second	task	is	
uncomfortable	for	scientists	–	post	normal	science	–	involves	the	acknowledged	addition	of	
values.22	However	it	is	that	last	task	that	attempts	to	connect	the	dots	of	uncertainty	by	
appealing	to	values	that	could	bear	the	mark	of	a	least	common	denominator.	What	the	
results	are,	does	depend	on	the	values	applied.	It	is	however	not	clear	that	it	is	possible	to	find	
that	least	common	denominator	for	all.	Or,	to	put	in	other	words	“the	authority	of	science	is	
not	a	foundation	for	factual	enlightenment	but	an	ideological	foundation	for	authoritarian	
policy	prescriptions	that	might	otherwise	be	difficult	to	implement”	in	world	of	wicked	
problems,	“more	likely	to	deliver	surprises	than	solutions.”23	
	Biotechnology	revisited	in	the	Chuthulucene	
	
The	transition	from	biotechnology	to	synthetic	biology	has	been	evolutionary,	and	in	keeping	
with	the	general	development	allowed	by	academic	and	economic	freedoms.	Still	while	there	
are	many	commonalities,	there	are	also	marked	differences.	The	most	radical	difference	being	
that	of	the	possibilities	enabled	by	the	discovery	of	a	group	of	genes	that	allow	for	very	precise	
engineering	of	genomes.24		
																																								 																				
19	Sheila	Jasanoff,	‘The	Idiom	of	Co-Production’,	in	States	of	Knowledge :	The	Co-
Production	of	Science	and	Social	Order,	ed.	Sheila	Jasanoff,	International	Library	of	
Sociology	(London:	Routledge,	2004),	1–12.	
20	Ibid.	
21	Ibid.	
22	Silvio	O.	Funtowicz	and	Jerome	R.	Ravetz,	‘Science	for	the	Post-Normal	Age’,	Futures	
25,	no.	7	(September	1993):	739–55;	Jerry	Ravetz,	‘The	Post-Normal	Science	of	
Precaution’,	Futures	36,	no.	3	(April	2004):	347–57.	
23	Allenby	and	Sarewitz,	The	Techno-Human	Condition,	122.	
24	Simon	N.	Waddington	et	al.,	‘A	Broad	Overview	and	Review	of	CRISPR-Cas	
Technology	and	Stem	Cells’,	Current	Stem	Cell	Reports	2,	no.	1	(11	February	2016):	9–
20;	Jacob	S.	Sherkow,	‘CRISPR:	Pursuit	of	Profit	Poisons	Collaboration’,	Nature	532,	no.	
7598	(13	April	2016):	172–73;	Eric	S.	Lander,	‘The	Heroes	of	CRISPR’,	Cell	164,	no.	1–2	
		The	Global	Ideologies	
	
A	recent	review	of	99	peer-reviewed	journal	articles	published	since	2004	on	the	social	impacts	
of	genetically	modified	(GM)	crops	in	agriculture	comes	to	the	conclusion	that	the	most	
commonly	studied	impact	–	economic	–	mainly	report	that	there	are	benefits	while	other	
social	impacts	that	are	less	studied	present	a	more	complex	picture.25		
	
Biotechnology	has	received	detailed	attention	in	international	law	,	international	relations,	and	
the	science	and	technology	studies	literature.26	Briefly	stated,	differences	of	opinion	and	
values	between	the	United	States	and	the	European	Union	over	the	regulation	of	genetically	
modified	organisms	have	resulted	in	a	lack	of	cooperation	and	stark	differences	in	regulatory	
standards	and	frameworks	while	the	rest	of	the	world	muddles	through.27		
One	view	is	that	there	is	no	perceived	public	crisis	in	biotechnology	that	created	a	specific	
regulatory	moment	as	has	been	the	case	for	other	regulatory	objects.28	That	may	be	so,	and	
the	differences	may	arise	from	a	multitude	of	sources,	and	they	may	be	endogenous	or	
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 																	
(14	January	2016):	18–28;	Daniel	Sarewitz,	‘CRISPR:	Science	Can’t	Solve	It’,	Nature	522,	
no.	7557	(23	June	2015):	413–14;	David	Cyranoski,	‘CRISPR	Tweak	May	Help	Gene-
Edited	Crops	Bypass	Biosafety	Regulation’,	Nature,	19	October	2015,	
http://www.nature.com/doifinder/10.1038/nature.2015.18590;	Jennifer	A.	Doudna	
and	Emmanuelle	Charpentier,	‘The	New	Frontier	of	Genome	Engineering	with	CRISPR-
Cas9’,	Science	346,	no.	6213	(28	November	2014):	1258096.	
25	Klara	Fischer	et	al.,	‘Social	Impacts	of	GM	Crops	in	Agriculture:	A	Systematic	
Literature	Review’,	Sustainability	7,	no.	7	(2	July	2015):	8598–8620.	
26	Thomas	Bernauer,	Genes,	Trade,	And	Regulation:	The	Seeds	Of	Conflict	In	Food	
Biotechnology	(Princeton	University	Press,	2003);	Susette	Biber-Klemm	et	al.,	
‘Challenges	of	Biotechnology	in	International	Trade	Regulation’,	in	The	Prospects	of	
International	Trade	Regulation:	From	Fragmentation	to	Coherence,	ed.	Thomas	Cottier	
and	Panagiotis	Delimatsis	(Cambridge ;	New	York:	Cambridge	University	Press,	2011),	
284–320;	Sheila	Jasanoff,	Designs	on	Nature:	Science	and	Democracy	in	Europe	and	the	
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	exogenous.29	The	problem	is	an	old	one.	What	looks	good	in	theory,	encounters	problems	
when	put	into	practice,	and	the	reality	may	be	more	complex	than	it	was	hoped	for.		
	
Academics,	farmers,	activists,	multinational	corporations,	government	officials	all	promote	
their	views	on	the	advantages	of	technology	or	its	regulation,	however	when	it	comes	to	GM	
crops	“the	scientific	data	are	often	inconclusive	or	contradictory”.30	In	2013	a	record	of	175.2	
million	hectares	of	biotech	crops	were	grown	globally.31		Meanwhile	a	bit	of	dust	has	started	to	
accumulate	on	some	of	earlier	texts	on	the	international	aspects	of	genetically	modified	
organisms	(GMO),		and	one	wonders	how	these	narratives	compare	with	local	farmer’s	
realities.		
	The	Local	Headaches	
	
Let’s	take	the	case	of	GM	cotton	which	constitutes	a	large	fraction	of	the	total	global	
production	of	all	of	GM	crops.	The	estimate	is	that	in	the	US	more	than	90	per	cent	of	the	
planted	cotton	is	2014	was	GM.32	In	Argentina	the	estimate	is	that	it	covers	about	80-90	per	
cent	of	the	area	sown	albeit	with	uncertified	transgenic	seed.33Briefly,	there	are	three	main	
types	of	GM	cotton	varieties	based	on	two	different	genetic	traits:	one	is	resistant	to	the	
herbicide	glyphosate	(also	known	by	Monsanto’s	trademark	Roundup),	another	produces	
toxins	that	kill	cotton	bollworm.	The	tree	types	of	GM	cotton	on	the	market	are:	one	that	is	
glyphosate	resistant,	one	that	produces	the	Bt	toxin,	and	a	third	incorporating	both	traits.	Over	
fifty	different	commercial	GM	cotton	seeds	have	been	approved.	The	seeds	trade	names	and	
details	are	available	in	databases	such	as	those	maintained	by	the	International	Service	for	the	
Acquisition	of	Agri-Biotech	Applications	34,	GMO	Compass.35	The	International	Cotton	Advisory	
Committee36	provides	statistics	on	world	cotton	production,	consumption,	trade,	and	serves	as	
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	a	clearing	house	for	technical	information	about	cotton	and	cotton	textiles;	it	also	represents	
the	international	cotton	industry	before	UN	agencies	and	other	international	organizations.	
	
In	theory	and	in	the	laboratory,	but	also	from	an	ideological	point	of	view,	great	opportunities	
for	better	integration	of	conventional	breeding	and	molecular	biology	to	improve	cultivars	and	
herald	a	new	age	in	cotton	improvement	seem	promising.37	It	is	claimed	that	80%	of	global	
cotton	production	in	2012	was	that	from	genetically	modified	seeds38	The	reality	on	the	
ground	tells	a	different	story.		
	
In	the	global	south,	one	study	in	the	Chaco	province	in	Argentina	what	was	found	was	that	
only	the	2	per	cent	of	farmers	with	more	than	200	hectares	of	land	and	producing	70	per	cent	
of	the	cotton	had	both	the	means	to	buy	certified	transgenetic	seed	and	both	the	knowledge	
and	scale	to	maintain	quality	of	successive	multiplications	of	saved	seed.39	To	add	insult	to	
injury,	the	‘2	per	cent	farmers’	are	also	adept	at	ignoring	contracts	that	would	bind	them	to	
take	recommended	measures	to	maintain	the	quality	of	the	new	seed	and	to	delay	
development	of	pest	resistance	to	the	Bt	toxin	while	the	majority	in	the	same	region	who	
obtain	non-certified	seeds	in	informal	markets	have	neither	the	gins	to	delint	the	seeds	nor	the	
knowledge	to	ensure	quality	or	make	the	best	of	what	they.40	That	is,	the	majority	of	these	
Argentinian	small	cotton	farmers	get	seeds	of	not	only	variable,	but	doubtful	quality	with	
transgenic	and	non-transgenic	traits,	and	due	to	the	lack	of	knowledge	or	mislabelling	farmers	
end	up	with	poor	yields	as	may	be	case	if	a	herbicide	resistance	is	assumed	when	instead	the	
non-certified	seed	is	pesticide	resistant.	That	is,	these	small	cotton	farmers	are	beyond	the	
reach	of	the	regulatory	regime.	In	this	case,	the	local	regulatory	agency	–	the	Insituto	Nacional	
de	Semillas	(INASE)	–	is	practically	incapable	of	asserting	any	oversight	especially	in	informal	
markets,	but	also	there	where	farmers	ignore	contractual	obligations	although	their	task	is	
that	of	applying	the	Seed	Law	(Ley	de	Semillas	Y	Creaciones	Fitogenéticas	N°	20.247).	The	
resulting	situation	is	one	where	regulation	of	the	technology	fails	at	several	levels	beyond	the	
international	modalities	that	made	it	possible	for	the	seed	to	enter	the	market.	The	interests	
of	those	whom	the	technology	ought	to	benefit	are	left	unattended	by	local	and	national	
governments.	The	rights,	moral	and	ethical	values	recognized	by	international	law	are	
orphaned.		
	
This	situation	also	raises	question	of	biosafety	and	biodiversity.	The	fact	that	uncontrolled	GM	
seeds	reach	the	informal	markets	without	biosafety	testing	and	approval,	leaves	open	the	
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	question	of	“regulatory	capacity	to	anticipate	and	diminish	potential	environmental	impacts,	
or	to	assure	international	markets	that	exported	products	are	what	they	purport	to	be”.41	
	
In	the	provinces	of	Hubei	and	Shandong	in	China	the	sociotechnical	dynamics	are	different	
from	those	in	the	Chaco	proving	in	Argentina,	and	correspondingly	the	regulatory	failures	are	
different.	Using	nationally	representative	panel	data,	Arza	and	van	Zwanenberg	analysed	the	
economic	impact	of	Bt	cotton	adoption	and	its	sustainability,	after	15	years	of	its	
commercialization	in	China.	Consistent	with	its	short-term	impact,	the	study	they	showed	that	
the	economic	benefit	of	Bt	cotton	did	not	diminish,	but	remained	stable	and	continuous	in	
China.42	Their	study	that	uses	nationally	representative	data	and	focuses	on	the	economic	
benefit	of	Bt	cotton	and	its	dynamics.	“As	shown	in	this	paper,	the	first	generation	of	cotton	
varieties	with	a	single	Bt	gene	still	can	effectively	control	the	bollworm.	Even	though	farmers	in	
some	countries	have	switched	from	unpatented	and	royalty	fee	cotton	varieties	with	a	single	
Bt	gene	to	patented	cotton	varieties	with	stacked	genes,	rigorous	analysis	is	needed	to	answer	
whether	this	switch	is	economical	or	a	result	caused	by	many	factors	.”43			
The	patterns	described	for	“international	transfer	to	and	adaptation	of	genetically	modified	
(GM)	cotton	in	Argentina,	and	ask	whether	political	bargaining	between	the	technology	owner,	
a	multinational	enterprise	(MNE),	and	host	country	actors	may	have	influenced	upgrading”	to	
GM	crops.	These	authors	suggest	that	“the	MNE	was	able	to	use	its	exclusive	capacity	to	
upgrade	GM	cotton	technologies	as	a	negotiation	tool	to	persuade	host	actors	to	change	the	
rules	that	affected	its	multiple	line	of	business	in	the	country.	This	implies	wider	policy	scope	
to	encourage	technology	upgrading;	host	actors	could	negotiate	over	a	wider	range	of	aspects	
of	interest	to	MNEs.”44			
	
That	there	many	more	problems	to	be	addressed	beyond	the	interests	of	multinational	
corporations	ought	to	be	evident.	That	is,	“despite	the	widespread	adoption	of	Bt	crops	and	a	
continued	increase	in	the	area	on	which	they	are	grown,	there	are	still	a	number	of	
unanswered	questions	associated	with	longer	term	agro-ecosystem	interactions,	for	instance	
the	impact	of	secondary	pests.”45		
Meanwhile	the	situation	is	not	optimal	in	the	global	north	either	even	if	the	problems	have	a	
different	character.	In	the	US	the	annual	statistics	for	1992	to	2009	on	cotton	planted	indicates	
that	while	the	percentage	of	genetically	modified	cotton	has	increased	to	nearly	90	per	cent,	
the	average	annual	total	herbicide	application	rate	for	cotton	(mass	per	area)	fails	to	show	a	
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	decrease	although	it	would	have	been	expected	according	to	theory	and	rationale	of	
introducing	transgenetic	traits.46		
	Regulation	and	Governance	Dreamscapes	
	
Nanotechnologies,	like	other	proceeding	technologies,	have	gotten	much	attention	and	a	too	
large	body	of	literature	has	been	generated	displaying	a	spectrum	of	views.	There	is	some	
agreement	that	there	are	two	main	dangers.	One	is	that	a	“blinkered	adherence	to	science-
driven	and	hierarchical	decision-making	approach”	in	regulation	will	ignore	the	values	of	the	
citizens	who	seek	to	influence	regulation	by	some	participative	or	other	legitimizing	
mechanisms.47	Another	is	that	perceptions	counter	to	current	scientific	understanding	may	
have	an	undue	or	non-justifiable	influence	on	regulatory	decisions.48	That	is,	balance	is	
required,	and	social,	regulatory	and	governance	innovation	is	called	upon	to	assure	
transparency,	legitimacy	and	trust	in	the	regulatory	process.	
	
	
	“We	have	come	to	the	point	in	synthetic	biology	where	there	are	many	lab-scale	or	proof-of-
concept	examples	of	chemically	controlled	systems	useful	to	sense	small	molecules,	treat	
disease,	and	produce	commercially	useful	compounds.	These	systems	have	great	potential,	but	
more	attention	needs	to	be	paid	to	their	stability,	efficacy,	and	safety.”49	(link	to	case	studies	
where	appropriate)	
	
Gervais	analysis	uses	a	classification	of	technology	that	is	interesting	as	an	analytical	tool,	and	
relies	mainly	on	the	precautionary	principle	application	to	leave	the	emerging	technology	
unregulated	and	pleads	for	a	nimble	regulatory	approach	(courts,	regulatory	agencies)	when	
risks	emerge.50	This	proposed	approach	ignores	the	nature	of	technology	and	co-production.	
(to	be	expanded)	
																																								 																				
46	See	Table	3	in:	Richard	H	Coupe	and	Paul	D	Capel,	‘Trends	in	Pesticide	Use	on	
Soybean,	Corn	and	Cotton	since	the	Introduction	of	Major	Genetically	Modified	Crops	
in	the	United	States’,	Pest	Management	Science,	1	August	2015,	n/a-n/a.	
47	Andrew	D.	Maynard,	Diana	M.	Bowman,	and	Graeme	A.	Hodge,	‘Conclusions:	
Triggers,	Gaps,	Risks	and	Trust’,	in	International	Handbook	on	Regulating	
Nanotechnologies,	ed.	Graeme	A.	Hodge,	Diana	M	Bowman,	and	Andrew	D.	Maynard	
(Cheltenham,	UK:	Elgar,	2010),	573–86.	
48	Ibid.	
49	Tyler	J	Ford	and	Pamela	A	Silver,	‘Synthetic	Biology	Expands	Chemical	Control	of	
Microorganisms’,	Current	Opinion	in	Chemical	Biology,	Synthetic	biology	•	Synthetic	
biomolecules,	28	(October	2015):	20–28.	
50	Daniel	J.	Gervais,	‘The	Regulation	of	Inchoate	Technologies’,	Houston	Law	Review	47,	
no.	3	(18	November	2010):	665–705.	
		
Harmonization	presumes	stable	and	widely	shared	goals.	Develop.	“How	do	harmonizing	
regulations	impact	on	the	opportunities	for	poorer	communities	in	developing	countries	to	
effectively	access	new	technologies,	assure	themselves	of	benefits,	whilst	guarding	against	
risks?	How	do	harmonizing	regulations	affect	the	capacity	of	poorer	communities,	local	and	
national	businesses,	and	national	governments	to	develop	locally	appropriate	forms	of	
technology	use?	Do	regulations	enable	environmentally	sustainable	and	socially	just	
technology	development	pathways	appropriate	to	specific	situations	or	do	they	hinder	
them?”51		
Last	but	not	least,	there	is	the	issue	of	what	can	WTO	do	to	deal	with	emerging	technologies.	
The	verdict	is	that	if	an	analysis	(type)	of	the	EU	GM	regulation	in	light	of	the	WTO	trade	
disputes	is	indeed	legal,	but	it	certainly	has	been	costly.52	Then	when	looked	at	in	detail,	while	
WTO	and	international	law	cannot	really	ease	the	burden	of	dealing	with	wicked	regulatory	
and	governance	problems,	a	streamlining	of	its	functions	could	be	helpful	is	reducing	of	of	the	
burdens.	(to	be	developed,	TBT	is	what	is	on	the	line,	it	is	about	standards	after	all).		
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